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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A §78-2a-3(j). The case was
transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment ("Board of Adjustment") has

authority under its jurisdiction to determine the existence of nonconforming uses to review the claim
of Stonebridge Land Holding Company ("Stonebridge") to a vested right to develop condominiums
in the foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon.
2.

Whether Stonebridge could have appealed to the Board of Adjustment the zoning

officials' refusal to act on its conditional use application to develop condominiums.
3.

Whether Stonebridge exhausted its administrative remedies beforefilingthis action

in the District Court when it refused to apply or appeal to the Board of Adjustment for determination
of its vested rights claim to develop condominiums .
4.

Whether the takings claim in this suit is ripe for adjudication when Stonebridge refused

to apply or appeal to the Board of Adjustment for determination of its vested rights claim or to apply
to the Board of Adjustment for variances to the current zoning.
5.

Whether Stonebridge was entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief and estoppel

when it failed to appeal the decision of the Salt Lake County Commission denying its conditional use
application to the District Court pursuant to §17-27-1001(2).
6.

Whether the District Court correctly treated the County's motion to dismiss as a

motion for summary judgment when the County filed an affidavit with the motion and both parties
produced evidence in the matter.

All issues are issues of law subject to review by the Court of Appeals for correctness. In Re
J.D.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Ut. App. 1991). The issues have been preserved for appeal by the motion to
dismiss, the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, and the oral argument. R-45-81, 148158, 170-185,230-266.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
1.

Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, defining the general

authority of the Board of Adjustment reads as follows:
19,92.030

Powers and duties.

The board of adjustment shall:
A.
Hear and decide appeals from the zoning decisions
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in 19.92.050;
B.
Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the
zoning ordinance as set forth in Section 19.92.060;
C.
Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance; and
D.
Determine the existence, expansion or modification of
nonconforming uses.
2.

Section 19.92.050. A. of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances defining authority

of the Board of Adjustment to hear appeals reads as follows:
19.92.050

Appeals.

A. 1. The applicant or any other person or entity adversely
affected by a zoning decision administering or interpreting a zoning
ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by
alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, decision or
determination made by an official in the administration or
interpretation of the zoning ordinance.

2

3.

Utah Code Ann. §17-27-704(1 )(a)(i) defining the authority of the Board of

Adjustment to hear appeals reads as follows:
17-27-704.

Appeals.

(1) (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity
adversely affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning
ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by
alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or
determination made by an official in the administration or
interpretation of the zoning ordinance.
4.

Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1) requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies reads

as follows:
17-27-1001.

Appeals.

(1)
No person may challenge in district court a county's
land use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation
made under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted
all administrative remedies.
5.

The R-1-15 zoning classification of the County zoning ordinance is attached hereto

as Addendum A.
6.

Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(2) providing an appeal to the district court from land

use decisions reads as follows:
(2)
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Stonebridge filed this action against County defendants in the Third District Court on

February 3, 1995. The complaint includes four causes of action:
1.

A declaratory judgment claim to a vested right to develop condominiums on the

foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon. R-9.
2.

A declaratory judgment claim to the right to develop the condominiums on the basis

of equitable estoppel. R-13.
3.

A claim that the action of the County constituted a taking of a vested right in violation

of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U. S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983. R-18.
4.

A claim that the County zoning ordinance as applied constitutes a taking without just

compensation. R-20.
Salt Lake County filed a motion to dismiss the case on March 7, 1995 on the grounds
Stonebridge failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior tofilingthis action and because the
matter was not ripe for adjudication. R-45-46. The motion was based upon the facts that
Stonebridge did not appeal or apply to the Board of Adjustment for a determination as to whether
it has a vested right to build the condominiums; did not apply to the Board of Adjustment for
variances in order to develop the property; and did not appeal the decision of the Salt Lake County
Commission to the District Court as provided in U.C.A. §10-2-1001(2). R-47-58.
The motion to dismiss was heard on June 19, 1995 by the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District
Court Judge. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of oral arguments and
4

by memorandum decision dated August 10, 1995, granted summary judgment dismissing the
complaint. The Court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment because the
County filed an affidavit with the motion and both parties introduced evidence for the Court to
consider. R-192-203. Addendum B. The Court resolved an issue concerning the form of the order
in a minute entry (R-215) and entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the County
on December 20, 1995. R-216. Addendum C.
Stonebridge filed this appeal on January 19, 1996. R-219-221.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On April 10, 1980, Ken Ekstrom1fileda conditional use application with the Salt Lake

County Planning Commission to develop a 75-unit condominium planned unit development on 29.5
acres of property zoned Agricultural A-l located at approximately 9750 South 4000 East in the
foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon. The property includes the 4.139 acres of land involved
in this suit. The estimated time for completion of the project stated on the application was three
years. R-72-74.
2.

On June 10, 1980, the Planning Commission gave a preliminary approval to the

application for 66 condominium units and three single family homes. R-75.
3.

In 1984, the Salt Lake Planning Commission gave final conditional use approval for

11 of the condominium units which have since been constructed. R-6. In 1986, a portion of the
planned unit development was converted to a residential subdivision which was approved on
December 22, 1986. R-7. A swimming pool and residential facility were also approved for the
property in 1986. R-7.

Ken Ekstrom is a prior owner of the property. R-73-74.
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4.

In 1986, Salt Lake County amended its hillside development ordinance to limit

development to slopes having a grade of less than 30 percent. R-10.
5.

In November of 1993, Salt Lake County initiated rezoning of a large area which

included the 4.139 acres of property from agriculture A-l to residential R-l-15. The rezoning was
completed in May of 1994. R-72.
6.

On March 31, 1994, which was several months after the R-l-15 zoning had been

initiated, Stonebridge filed a conditional use application with the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission for approval of 16 condominium units on the 4.139 acres. The proposed development
does not comply with the 30 percent slope requirement or the R-l-15 zoning requirements. R-72.
This was the first conditional use application for condominium units since the 1984 approval. R-6,
7.2
7.

On October 25, 1994, the Salt Lake Planning Commission heard the application. At

that meeting, counsel for Stonebridge contended that it had a vested right to the 16 condominium
units based on the 1980 approval. The vested right was disputed by community representatives. The
application was continued until November 8, 1994. R-78.
8.

At the November 8, 1994 meeting, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office advised

the Planning Commission that the Board of Adjustment, and not the Planning Commission, had
jurisdiction to decide the nonconforming use issues and to determine whether Stonebridge has a
vested right to continue the project based on the 1980 preliminary approval.

2

The Planning

Other facts as to what transpired between 1980 and 1994 are in dispute between Stonebridge and certain
Granite area residents. The Granite area residents' version of the facts are set forth in a memorandum from the law firm
of Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee filed with the Board of County Commissioners. R-59-70. Those facts are
relevant to the merits of the Stonebridge's vested rights claim but not to the procedural issues before the Court at this
time.
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Commission then denied the application on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. R-79. The County
Attorney's Office had previously advised counsel for Stonebridge it believed the Board of
Adjustment, and not the Planning Commission, had jurisdiction over nonconforming use issues.
R-178.
9.

Stonebridge appealed the Planning Commission decision to the Board of County

Commissioners, which denied the appeal on December 7, 1994. R-10.
10.

Stonebridge has not appealed or applied to the Board of Adjustment for a

determination as to whether it has a vested right to continue the project as a nonconforming use and
has not applied to the Board of Adjustment for variances from the current R-1-15 zoning
requirements. R-73. Stonebridge also did not appeal the December 7, 1994, decision of the Board
of County Commissioners to the Third District Court pursuant to U.C.A. §17-27-1001(2).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The substantive issue in this case is whether Stonebridge now has a vested right to build 16
condominium units on 4.139 acres of land in the foothills southeast of Salt Lake County. The
development would be in conflict with the slope requirements of the hillside development ordinance
enacted in 1986 and the R-1-15 zoning classification (single family dwelling) enacted in 1994. The
claim is based upon a preliminary approval of the conditional use application given by the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") in 1980, to a previous owner of the property,
to build 66 condominium units on 29.5 acres of property which includes the 4.139 acres at issue.
The Utah Supreme Court in Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396
(Utah 1980) set forth the following test for establishment of a vested right to a building permit or
subdivision approval:
7

...[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision
approval if his proposed development meets the zoning requirements
in existence at the time of his application and if he proceeds with
reasonable diligence absent a compelling countervailing public
interest....
A debatable issue exists as to whether Stonebridge has a vested right to now develop the
condominium based upon the 1980 preliminary approval. This is an issue which could have been
decided at the administrative level, possibly avoiding the necessity for litigation at all. Stonebridge
chose to have the Planning Commission decide the vested rights issue pursuant to its conditional use
application; however, the Planning Commission does not have the authority to decide a vested rights
claim. That authority lies with the Board of Adjustment. First, the Board of Adjustment could have
decided the vested rights claim under its authority to determine nonconforming uses. Secondly, the
Board of Adjustment could have decided the vested rights claim through an appeal by Stonebridge
of the decision of the planning staff not to process the conditional use permit. This was a decision
of a zoning official in the administration of the zoning ordinance which the Board of Adjustment has
appellate authority to review.
Under Utah law, a person must first exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to
court. Because Stonebridge refused to exhaust its administrative remedies by having the Board of
Adjustment decide its vested rights claim, the trial court correctly dismissed Stonebridge's First and
Second Causes of Action seeking declaratory and estoppel relief.
The takings claims were also properly dismissed by the trial court under the doctrine of
ripeness and finality. In order for a takings claim to be ripe for adjudication, the plaintiff must show
that afinaladministrative decision has been made and there is no possibility of administrative relief.
In this case, there is nofinaladministrative decision. Stonebridge did not make an application to the
8

Board of Adjustment seeking a determination of its vested rights claim, nor did it apply to the Board
for variances to the present R-l-15 zoning.
The futility exception to the ripeness doctrine is not applicable because the Board of
Adjustment has the authority to grant the variances which Stonebridge needs to develop a planned
unit development condominium under the R-1 -15 zoning. The fact that Stonebridge may not obtain
variances which would allow the specific development it now proposes does not mean the matter is
ripe for litigation. Prior tofilinga taking action, a party claiming a vested right must administratively
pursue the claim to the vested right based upon the prior zoning and also must seek available
variances to the current zoning even though variances cannot be granted for the exact development
claimed as a vested right.
Finally, Stonebridge ignored its right of appeal to the District Court under U.C.A. §17-271001(2) from the decision of the Planning Commission and County Commission denying its
conditional use on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When an appeal is specifically provided, an
alternative form of action such as declaratory relief is not available.
Because Stonebridge failed to pursue its right of appeal under U.C.A. §17-27-1001 and
because it also failed to apply to the Board of Adjustment for variances to have its vested rights claim
determined, the lower court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the County.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
TRIAL
COURT
CORRECTLY
DISMISSED
STONEBRIDGE'S FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND ESTOPPEL
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO EXHAUST ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
9

Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances sets forth the powers and
duties of the Board of Adjustment That ordinance reads as follows:
The board of adjustment shall:
A
Hear and decide appeals from the zoning decisions
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in 19.92.050,
B.
Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the
zoning ordinance as set forth in Section 19 92.060;
C.
Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance; and
D.
Determine the existence, expansion or modification of
nonconforming uses.
The trial court held that Stonebridge could have applied to the Board of Adjustment under
subsection D above claiming that it has a vested right to a nonconforming use status; it could have
appealed to the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the County refused to acknowledge
its vested rights claim, and could have applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C for
variances to the current R-l-15 zone.
An analysis of the statutory powers of the Board of Adjustment shows the trial court correctly
dismissed the first two causes of action because Stonebridge failed to exhaust its remedies by applying
or appealing to the Board for a determination of its vested rights claim3
A.

THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER ITS AUTHORITY
TO DETERMINE NONCONFORMING USES TO REVIEW STONEBRIDGE'S
VESTED RIGHTS CLAIM.

The authority of the Board of Adjustment to grant variances is discussed in Point II of this brief

10

Stonebridge attempts to argue through the chart in its brief that a vested right and a
nonconforming use are distinct and unrelated concepts. The treatises and many cases make it clear,
however, that the concept of a nonconforming use includes both a claim of a vested right, based on
an application or permit, as well as a development which is built and in use prior to a zoning change.
This is explained in 83 AmJur.2d Planning and Zoning §635 at page 533:
...However, not withstanding the foregoing rule, some courts have
recognized a right of nonconforming use (or the existence of a "vested
right") where a land owner substantially changes his position upon the
likely issuance of a permit....
Anderson'^ American Law and Zoning, §620 at page 541, states that the guidelines are the
same whether you are considering an existing use as provided in an ordinance or the concept of
vested rights developed in the courtroom:
...As in the case of existing uses preserved by ordinance, the nature
and extent of use which will qualify as a nonconforming one because
it enjoys a vested right to continue are determined case by case. The
guidelines seem the same whether the question is one of construing
the term "existing use" as employed in an ordinance or applying a
courtroom developed concept of vested right. It is not uncommon for
the two terms to be used in the same case, an existing use being
described as a use of land which enjoys a vested right to continue
notwithstanding its offense to the zoning regulations.
As suggested in Anderson, courts have held that the term nonconforming use includes a
vested rights claim based upon something less than actual use of the property. Clackamas County
v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190, 192 (Or. 1973). ("The allowance of a nonconforming use applies not only
to those actually in existence but also to uses which are in various stages of development when the
zoning ordinance is enacted.") The terms "vested right" and "nonconforming use" have often been
used by the courts interchangeably to refer to partially completed developments and fully completed

11

developments. Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn. 1979). ("Where a
nonconformity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself....") Hoffmann v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965); City of Blue Springs v. Gregory, 764 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
The Utah courts have also considered a vested rights claim based upon a development
application to be part of the concept of a nonconforming use. lnJudkins v. Fronk, 234 P.2d 849, 850
(Utah 1951) the Court stated as follows:
It is appellant's contention that having obtained a valid permit
to build a service station and in reliance thereon, expended funds and
did work, he thereby obtained a vested right which could not be
affected by a subsequent zoning ordinance making his proposed use
of the building a nonconforming use.... (Emphasis added.)
In this case, part of the original 1980 development was completed prior to the zoning
amendments in 1986 and 1994, and part of that development has never been completed. The
development has also gone through many application changes since the preliminary approval 16 years
ago. Therefore, under Stonebridge's definitions, it is claiming both nonconforming uses and vested
rights for different parts of the development. In reality, the entire issue should be considered as a
nonconforming use issue which can be decided by the Board of Adjustment.
B.

STONEBRIDGE COULD HAVE APPEALED THE DECISION OF THE COUNTY
ZONING OFFICIALS NOT TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS VESTED RIGHT CLAIM TO
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT.
Regardless of whether the vested rights claim fits within the authority of the Board of

Adjustment to determine nonconforming uses under § 19.92.030.D. of the County zoning ordinance,
Stonebridge was not left without an administrative remedy. Stonebridge in its brief claims that
County zoning staff officials, refused to process its conditional use application to the Planning
12

Commission.4 Stonebridge could have appealed that decision to the Board of Adjustment under
§19.92.030.A. The scope of the Board of Adjustment's appellate jurisdiction to review decisions
"applying the zoning ordinance" is set forth in §19.92.050. A(l) of the County zoning ordinance5
which reads as follows:
"The appellant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a
decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may appeal
that decision applying a zoning ordinance by alleging that there is
error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an
official in the administration or interpretation of the zoning
ordinance.." (Emphasis added.)
In 1994 zoning officials would not process Stonebridge's conditional use application because
it was contrary to the current zoning ordinance, which in effect denied the existence of the vested
right claim. The failure of zoning officials to process a development is a determination made by the
zoning officials, in the administration of the zoning ordinance, which the Board of Adjustment could
have reviewed under its appellate jurisdiction. Hatch v. Utah County Planning Department, 685 P.2d
550 (Ut. 1984). The appeal could not be considered an appeal of a conditional use decision, since
the Planning Commission had not considered the application at that time.
Stonebridge argues that §19.92.050.D. of the County ordinances, which prohibits appeals to
the Board of Adjustment that seek to waive or modify the terms of the zoning ordinance, deprives
the board of jurisdiction to determine whether it has a vested right to develop. However, a
determination of a vested right is not a modification or waiver of the current zoning ordinance, it is

4

Stonebridge brief, p. 25.

5

Section 19.92.050.A is nearly identical to U.C.A. § 17-27-704(1 )(a)(i), the enabling legislation for appeals to
the Board of Adjustment.
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the establishment of a development right prior to the existence of the current ordinance. Stonebridge
had the right to allege that right through an appeal to the Board of Adjustment.
C.

UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES THAT A PARTY EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE BRINGING A LAND USE ACTION IN
THE DISTRICT COURT.
Stonebridge chose to ignore its administrative remedies before the Board of Adjustment prior

to proceeding to District Court. This course of action is contrary to Utah law. U.C.A. §17-271001(1) enacted in 1991 provides as follows:
1.
No person may challenge in district court a county's land use
decision made under this chapter or under regulation made under the
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their administrative
remedies.
The Utah courts have also held that judicial review of a decision resulting from the
administration of a zoning ordinance is not permitted without a prior hearing by the Board of
Adjustment. Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Comm., 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah
1983); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Department, supra. Other jurisdictions have held that issues
concerning a nonconforming use must be appealed to the Board of Adjustment prior to the affected
party filing an action for declaratory judgment. N. G. Heimos Greenhouse, Inc. v. City of Sunset
Hills, 597 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Schafer v. City of Pacific, 807 S.W.2d 207, 209
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Hopewell Gardens, Inc. v. Town ofEastFishfcill, 349 N.Y.S.2d 481 (NYFC
1973); Thomas v. City of Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
The two Utah cases cited above are closely in point to the facts herein. In Merrihew, the
plaintiff filed an action seeking an extraordinary writ after the building inspector revoked his building
permit. The Utah Supreme Court ordered that the petition be dismissed because plaintiff had not
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appealed building officials' administrative decision to the Board of Adjustment pursuant to U.C.A.
§17-27-16, the predecessor statute to U.C.A. §17-27-704 The Court stated the principle as follows:
...Consequently, we reaffirm that the general proposition of law that
parties must exhaust their administrative remedy as a prerequisite to
seeking judicial review is applicable to the claims relating to denial of
a permit....
The Hatch case is even closer in point. The plaintiff in Hatch brought an action for an
extraordinary writ, injunctive relief and damages when the Utah County Planning Department refused
to take action on his application for a boat launching facility by tabling it. The Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint because the plaintiff had failed to appeal the decision of
the Planning Department officials to the Board of Adjustment under U.C.A. §17-27-16.
Similarly, in this case, Stonebridge could have appealed to the Board of Adjustment from the
zoning officials' refusal to take action on its conditional use application, requesting that the Board
determine its vested rights claim. It could also have applied directly to the Board of Adjustment to
have the Board determine its vested rights claim under the Board's authority to determine
nonconforming uses. Instead, Stonebridge insisted that the vested rights claim be determined as a
part of its conditional use permit by the Planning Commission. There is no authority under State law
or County ordinance which allows the Planning Commission to determine a vested rights issue and
the Planning Commission properly declined jurisdiction to do so.
Under Stonebridge's position, neither the Planning Commission nor the Board of Adjustment
has jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue.6 This position would force the County or property

Stonebridge claimed in its trial memorandum that the Planning Commission, as well as the Board of
Adjustment lacked jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue R-96.
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owners into litigation every time a vested rights issue arose in conjunction with a development
application. Such a result is not favored under the law. Contrary to Stonebridge's contention, the
Board of Adjustment does have jurisdiction to decide a vested rights claim and, therefore,
Stonebridge's declaratory and estoppel claims were properly dismissed by the trial court when it
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing this action.
POINT H
THE TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO SATISFY THE
DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS AND FINALITY.
A.

IN ORDER FOR A TAKINGS CLAIM TO BE RIPE FOR LITIGATION, THERE
MUST BE A FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION CONCERNING THE LEVEL
OF DEVELOPMENT THAT WELL BE ALLOWED ON THE PROPERTY.
The United States Supreme Court has held that in order for a takings claim to be ripe for

adjudication, the plaintiff must show that a final decision has been made and there is no possibility of
administrative relief Agins v. City ofTiberron, 447 U.S. 255; 100 S. Ct. 2138; 65 L. Ed.2d 106
(1980). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the District of
Utah have also held that a regulatory taking claim is not ripe for adjudication until a final decision
regarding the application of the regulation has been made. Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc.
v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1989); Bateman v. City of Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 708
(10th Cir. 1996) (failure to apply to Board of Adjustment for variances and nonconforming use
determination); Anderson v. Alpine City, 804 F. Supp. 269, 272 (Dist. Ut. 1992).
State courts have also applied the finality and ripeness rules to takings claims under both the
state and federal constitutions. City of El Paso v. Madero Development, 803 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex.
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Ct. App. 1991); Hayv. CityofAndover, 436N.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Galbraith
v. Planning Dept of City of Anderson, 627 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
A case which closely parallels the facts in this case is Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n. v. Hamilton, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed.2d 126 (1985). In Williamson, the
developer obtained approval from a local planning commission of a preliminary plat for the
development of a tract of land in accordance with the requirements of a zoning ordinance for
clustered development. After construction of some of the units, the ordinance was changed so as to
reduce the allowable density of the remaining units. The developer filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S. C.
§1983 alleging that a taking had occurred without just compensation. The Supreme Court held:
[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a
taking of property interest is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.
473 U.S. at 186; 105 S. Ct. at 3116; 87 L. Ed.2d at 139.
The Planning Commission had reached the decision that the plaintiff therein was not entitled
to build under the old ordinance. The Supreme Court held that there was still not a final decision
because the plaintiff had not sought variances from the applicability of the new ordinance.
In this case there has been no determination by the County as to what level of development
will be permitted on the Stonebridge property under the prior zoning classification on the basis of the
vested rights claim or under the present zoning classification through the application for variances.
B.

THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HAS JURISDICTION TO GRANT VARIANCES
TO THE HILLSIDE AND R-l-15 ZONING ORDINANCES.
The Board of Adjustment is specifically empowered under state law to grant variances to the

requirements of the county zoning ordinance. U.C.A. §17-27-703 (c). Stonebridge correctly points
17

out in its brief that the Board of Adjustment may not grant use variances; however, Stonebridge does
not need a use variance to build a condominium planned unit development or to apply for variances
from the slope requirements of the hillside development ordinance or the density requirements of the
R-l-15 zoning.
Variances are divided into two types: "use" variances and "area" variances. A use variance
is one which permits a use not allowed under the zoning ordinance such as a commercial use in a
residential zone, while an area variance is a modification to area, yard, density, frontage, height or
similar restrictions. CityofMerriam v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 748 P.2d 883 (Kan. 1988); Alumni
Control Bd v. City of Lincoln, 137 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Neb. 1965); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson
Board of Adjustment, 529 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1974).
In Salt Lake County, planned unit developments are specifically allowed as a conditional use
in the R-l-15 zoning so Stonebridge does not need a use variance for its planned unit development.7
Condominiums are not regulated by any Salt Lake County ordinance so Stonebridge does not need
a use variance for a condominium development in the R-l-15 zoning. A slope variance to the hillside
development ordinance and a density variance to the R-l-15 zoning fall into the category of area
variances which the Board of Adjustment could consider in this case.
In order to build in the R-l-15 zoning classification, Stonebridge's development proposal
would have to be modified to eliminate common walls for the condominium units as it would be a use
variance to allow two family dwellings in one building in the R-l-15 zone. However, the fact that
Stonebridge may not be able to obtain variances to build the exact development it now desires does

A copy of the R-1 -15 zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County is reproduced in Appendix A.
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not mean that the matter is ripe for litigation 8 The courts have made it clear that there has to be a
determination as to what level of development will be allowed on the property before a takings case
is ripe Williamson County Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton, 473 U S at 186, 1055 S Ct at
3116, 87 L Ed at 139, Anderson v. Alpine City, 804 F Supp at 272-73, Seguin v. City of Sterling
Heights, 968 F 2d 584, 587 (6th Cir 1992)

For instance, in Williamson, the plaintiff could have

obtained variances to only five of the eight objections to the plat under the new ordinance9 Still, the
Supreme Court held there was not afinaldecision because the plaintiff had not sought variances from
the applicability of the new ordinance although the developer could not have obtained all the
variances needed to build the same development claimed as a vested right under the previous
ordinance
Like the plaintiflF in Williamson, Stonebridge could apply for variances to most of the current
zoning requirements which prevent the development from being constructed Because it has not done
so, no determination can be made as to what level of development will be allowed under the R-l-15
zone for the Stonebridge property
C.

THE FUTILITY EXCEPTION TO THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Stonebridge claims that it would be futile to apply for variances and, therefore, the matter is

ripe for litigation The futility exception to the ripeness and finality doctrine simply stated means that
no remedies are available or that a plaintiff should not be required to pursue a futile course of action
in order to ripen its claim The plaintiff bears a strong burden to demonstrate futility and the mere
Stonebridge can hardly complain that even if it obtains variances, it cannot build the exact development plan
it now proposes since this development is substantially different from the 1980 development which is the basis of the
vested rights claim
9

473 U S at 188,1055 S Ct at 3117, 87 L Ed 2d at 139-140
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allegations of futility are insufficient to support a claim. American Savings & Loan Assn. v. County
of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981); Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc., 874 F.2d at 722.
The cases cited by Stonebridge to support its claim of futility have no relevance to the facts
of this case. Contrary to Stonebridge's representation, the case of Greenbriar Ltd. v. City of
Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) was not a takings case. Rather, it was a due process case
challenging the denial of a rezoning application. The Court held that since variances changing a
zoning classification were not permissible, the rezoning decision was a final decision. In each of the
Ninth Circuit cases cited by plaintiff, Hoene v. County of San Bonito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989)
and Harrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), the developer had applied to the
local government for a subdivision approval under the existing ordinance which permitted the
development. The local government denied the development and then changed the zoning ordinance
to prohibit development. Variances to the zoning ordinance were not allowed under the applicable
law. The court in each case held the case was ripe for adjudication since the subdivision was
conclusively rejected by the local government on the merits and variances were not a legal option.
Likewise, the other cases cited by Stonebridge concerning the futility issue, including the case
ofHatton-Wardv. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Ut. App. 1992), either involved situations
where the local government had decided the issue or where the administrative body was not
empowered to decide the issue. Here, the facts are just the opposite. The County Planning
Commission has not denied Stonebridge's right to develop; rather, it has only decided it does not
have jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue after having granted a preliminary approval to the
development some 16 years ago. The Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction to decide Stonebridge's
claim to a vested right and to grant variances to the present ordinance. It is not a case where a
20

remedy does not exist; rather, it is a case where the developer has refused to pursue the appropriate
remedy.
Stonebridge argues the rezoning of the property by the County Commission means the
County has already decided the nonconforming use and variance issues. The argument has no merit
since the purpose of the Board of Adjustment is to consider variances, appeals, and nonconforming
use issues. Because the County Commission has rezoned the area does not dictate the results of an
application to the Board of Adjustment for variances or for a determination concerning the vested
right. Despite Stonebridge's claims to the contrary, the facts are clear that there has been no final
administrative determination as to what level of development will be allowed on the Stonebridge
property and therefore the matter is not ripe for litigation.

POINT m
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CASE
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO APPEAL THE
DECISION OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION TO THE
DISTRICT COURT AS PROVIDED IN U.C.A. §17-27-1001.
An appeal is specifically provided for by statute from conditional use and other zoning
decisions by counties. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(2) reads as follows:
17-27-1001. Appeals.
*

*

*

(2)
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of this decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered.
Under the above statute Stonebridge had 30 days from the County Commission decision of
December 7, 1994, to file a petition appealing that decision. The complaint was not filed until
February 10, 1995, 65 days after the County Commission decision. Failure to file a timely appeal is
21

jurisdictional. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1982)
Stonebridge cannot avoid the 30 day statutory appeal period by filing a declaratory judgment
action. When an appeal is specifically provided for by statute, an alternative form of action is not
available

Crist v. Maple ton City, 497 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1972) (mandamus not substitute for an

appeal); Punohu v. Sunn, 666 P.2d 1133 (Ha. 1983) (declaratory judgment action not substitute for
an appeal); V-l Oil Co. v. County of Bannock, 554 P.2d 1304 (Id. 1976) (declaratory judgment not
substitute for appeal) Otherwise, a person neglecting tofilea timely appeal could avoid the statutory
time period by calling the appeal a declaratory judgment action.
Stonebridge attempts to avoid the requirements of Section 17-27-1001(2) by arguing in its
brief that this is not an appeal of the conditional use decision because the Planning Commission and
County Commission never reached the merits of the case.10 The fact that an administrative body
makes its decision on the basis of jurisdiction does not foreclose that decision from being reviewed
by the district court through the appellate process provided for in U.C.A. §17-27-1001(2).
However, assuming arguendo that Stonebridge's argument is correct, Stonebridge still had
an administrative remedy it should have pursued. This Court has held that decisions of the Board of
County Commissioners are decisions of an "administrative official" for purposes of an appeal to the
Board of Adjustment under U.C.A. §17-27-704. Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897 P.2d
1232 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, if this case is not viewed as a review of a conditional use decision,

Stonebridge argues both sides of the issue On pages 18 and 19 of its brief, Stonebridge argues it could not
have appealed the decision of the County Commission denying jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue to the Board
of Adjustment because the appeal would have been an appeal of a conditional use decision which the Board of
Adjustment is prohibited from hearing. On page 21 of the brief, Stonebridge argues the opposite position - that this is
not an appeal because the Planning Commission and County Commission never reached the merits of the application
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Stonebridge should have appealed the decision of the County Commission denying jurisdiction to
consider Stonebridge's vested rights claim to the Board of Adjustment under 19.92.030 of the County
zoning ordinance. However, if it is viewed as a conditional use decision, as the County contends, the
decision should have been appealed to the District Court under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001(2). Either way,
Stonebridge had an appropriate remedy it failed to follow prior to bringing this action and, therefore,
the trial court correctly dismissed the case. Because the Court considered matters outside the
pleading, the motion to dismiss was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Salt Lake County
defendants because Stonebridge failed to have the Board of Adjustment determine its vested rights
claim prior to proceeding with this action and failed to appeal the decision of the Board of County
Commissioners declining to determine the vested rights claim to the District Court under U.C.A.
§17-27-1001(2). For the reasons stated in this brief, Salt Lake County asks that the decision of the
District Court be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this
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ADDENDUM A

19.26.010

Chapter 19-26
R-l-15 RESIDENTIAL ZONE
Sections:
19.26.010
19.26.020
19.26.030
19.26.040
19.26.045
19.26.050
19.26.060
19.26.070
19.26.080

Purpose of provisionsPermitted uses.
Conditional uses.
Lot areaLot width.
Front yard.
Side yard.
Rear yard.
Building height

19.26.010
Purpose of provisions.
The purpose of the R-l-15 zone is to provide
neighborhoods in the county for single-family residential development (Prior code § 22-12A-1)
19.26.020
Permitted uses.
Permitted uses in the R-l-15 zone include:
— Accessory uses and buildings customarily
incidental to permitted uses;
— Agriculture;
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section
19.04.293;
— Household pets;
— Single-family dwelling. (Ord. 1179 § 5 (part),
1992; § 1 (part) of Ord. passed 2/1/84; prior code
§ 22-12A-2)

19.26.040
Lot area.
The minimum lot area in the R-l-15 zone shall
be not less than fifteen thousand square feet. (Prior
code § 22-12A-4)

19.26.030
Conditional uses.
Conditional uses in the R-l-15 zone include:
— Day care/preschool center, subject to Section
19.76.260;
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section
19.04.293;
— Home occupation;
— Nursery and greenhouse, provided that there
is no retail shop operated in connection therewith;
— Pigeons, subject to city-county health department regulations;
— Planned unit development;

(S*k Lake Cooacy S-93)

— Private educational institutions having an
academic curriculum similar to that ordinarily given
in public schools;
— Private nonprofit recreational grounds and
facilities;
— Public and quasi-public uses;
— Residential facility for elderly persons;
— Residential health care facility for up to five
residents excluding the facility operator and his/her
related family with a maximum of one nonresident
part-time relief employee on the premises at any one
time, which use shall not change the residential
appearance and character of the property;
— Sportsman's kennel (minimum lot area one
acre);
— Temporary buildings for uses incidental to
construction work, which buildings must be removed upon the completion or abandonment of the
construction work. If such buildings are not removed within ninety days upon completion of construction work and thirty days after notice, the
buildings will be removed by the county at the
expense of the owner. (Ord. 1200 § 4 (part), 1992;
Ord. 1179 § 6 (part), 1992; Ord. 1118 § 5 (part),
1990; (part) of Ord. passed 12/15/82; prior code §
22-12A-3)

19.26.045
Lot width.
The minimum width of any lot in the R-l-15
zone shall be eighty feet, at a distance thirty feet
back from the front lot line. (Ord. 1056 § 3, 1989)
19.26.050
Front yard.
In the R-l-15 zone, the minimum depth of the
front yard for main buildings, and for private garages which have a minimum side yard of ten feet shall
be thirty feet All accessory buildings, other than
private garages, which have a side yard of at least
ten feet, shall be located at least six feet in the rear
of the main building. (Prior code § 22-12A-7)

596

19.26.O0U

19-26-060
Side yard
In the R-l-15 zone, the minimum side yard for
any dwelling shall be ten feet, and the total width
of the two required side yards shall be not less than
twenty-four feet Other main buildings shall have a
minimum side yard of twenty feet, and the total
width of the two required side yards shall be not
less than forty feet The minimum side yard for a
private garage shall be ten feet except that private
garages and other accessory buildings located in the
rear and at least six feet away from the main building may have a minimum side yard of one foot
provided that no private garage or other accessory
building shall be located closer than ten feet to a
dwelling on an adjacent lot On corner lots, the side
yard which feces on a street for both main and
accessory buildings shall be not less than twenty
feet (Prior code § 22-12A-5)

2. Thirty-five feet on other properties;
B. No dwelling structure shall contain less than
one story- (Ord. 1237 § 3, 1993)

19-26-070
Rear yard.
In R-l-15 zones, the minimum depth of the rear
yard for any main building shall be thirty feet and
for accessory buildings one foot; provided that on
corner lots which rear upon the side yard of another
lot accessory buildings shall be located not closer
than ten feet to such side yard. (Prior code §
22-12A-8)
19-26-080
Building height
A. Except as otherwise specifically provided in
this tide, no building or structure shall exceed the
following height
1. Thirty feet on property where the slope of the
original ground surface exceeds fifteen percent or
the property is located in the hillside protection
zone. The slope shall be determined using a line
drawn from the highest point of elevation to the
lowest point of elevation on the perimeter of a box
which encircles the foundation line of the building
or structure. The box shall extend for a distance of
fifteen feet or to the property line, whichever is less,
around the foundation line of the building or structure. The elevation shall be determined using a
certified topographic survey with a maximum contour interval of two feet;
(Salt Ufce Coonty ft-93)

ADDENDUM B

By
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 950900959

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI;
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERS ON;
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10;
Defendants•

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
defendants'1 "Motion to Dismiss11 plaintiff's2 Complaint. Plaintiff
opposed this motion. On June 19, 1995, the parties, through their
respective counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson
in behalf of plaintiff, and Kent S. Lewis, Deputy County Attorney,
in behalf of defendants, presented oral argument to the Court. At

defendants in this matter are Salt Lake County, the Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Randy Horiuchi, Mary
Callahan, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Planning Commission and
John Does 1-10. Collectively they are referred to as "defendants.11
2

Plaintiff is Stonebridge Land Holding Company and is hereafter
referred to as "plaintiff" or "Stonebridge."

.^ r r
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement.
The Court has now carefully considered the Motion, Memoranda
and Affidavit and other documents submitted by the parties, and the
arguments of counsel*

Based on the foregoing, and for good cause

shown, the Court hereby enters the following ruling.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds
it fails to state a cause upon which relief can be granted and that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

More

particularly, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies and that the matter is not ripe for
adjudication.

Defendants

further

contend

that

the

Planning

Commission properly refused to consider Stonebridge's conditional
use application on the grounds that (1) the Board of Adjustments
and not the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had authority to
decide the vested rights issue; (2) Stonebridge failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies by refusing to request the Board of
Adjustments

to

consider

its

claims;

and

(3)

Stonebridge's

constitutional taking claim is not ripe for adjudication because
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County
as to what it will be allowed to construct.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

This Motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion is that it must be "apparent that under no set of facts
proven in support of the claim as pleaded would [Stonebridge] be
entitled to relief."

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olsen, Inc.. 815 P.2d

1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991).
In this case, defendants submitted an affidavit in support of
their Motion, and both parties produced other evidence for the
Court to consider.

Accordingly, this Motion may be treated as a

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

The standard for summary

judgment is that there may be no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The non-moving party is
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence presented to the Court.3
The central issue in this case revolves around who, among the
defendants, if anyone, has the authority to determine whether a
particular

interest claimed

constitutes a

"vested right" and

whether a "vested right" should be considered the same as or at

Notwithstanding the fact defendants submitted the Affidavit
and both parties produced other evidence to the Court, the parties
have approached this motion as a motion to dismiss and not as a
motion for summary judgment.
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least comparable to a non-conforming use.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The material facts in

this case are not in dispute, they are set forth fully in the
pleadings.

I.
Pursuant to Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of
Ordinances, 1986, the Board of Adjustment has the power to
A.
Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in Section
19.92.050;
B.
Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms
of the zoning ordinances set forth in Section 19.92.060;
C.
Hear and decide variances from the terms of the
zoning ordinance; and
D.
Determine the existence, expansion or modification
of nonconforming use.
Under Section 19.92.030 plaintiff could have (1) appealed to
the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the Development
Services Division refused to acknowledge plaintiff's vested rights
claim; (2) applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C
for variances to the current R-l-15 zoning; or (3) applied to the
Board of Adjustment under subsection D claiming it has a vested
right to nonconforming use status.
Instead of pursuing its claim before the Board of Adjustment,
plaintiff proceeded to file its Complaint

in district court.

Pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(1) Utah Code Ann. (1991) , ,f[n]o
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person may

challenge
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in district

MEMORANDUM DECISION

court a county's

land use

decisions made under this chapter or under regulation made under
authority

of

this

chapter

until

they

have

exhausted

their

administrative remedies."
Plaintiff claims that the Board of Adjustment does not have
jurisdiction to consider

its claim because plaintiff's claim

concerns a claimed vested right as opposed to a nonconforming use
and that no ordinance or other law authorizes the Board of
Adjustment to determine the existence of "vested rights."
Howeverf Section 19.92.030 clearly authorizes the Board, among
other things, to determine the existence of "nonconforming uses."
The concepts of "vested rights" and "nonconforming uses" have been
used interchangeably in other jurisdictions to refer to partially
completed developments as well as fully completed developments.
Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn.
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes. 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973)4.
Based on the foregoing and the other arguments set forth by
defendants,

because

plaintiff

failed

to

have

the

Board

of

Adjustment decide plaintiff's issues, plaintiff's first and second
causes of action are dismissed.

4

See,
also,
the
discussion
regarding
vested
rights/nonconforming uses in Section II and other arguments set
forth by defendants.
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II.
Plaintiff presented its cause to the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission notwithstanding
their determination that plaintiff should proceed before the Board
of Adjustments.

As such, plaintiff ignored its requirement to

exhaust its administrative remedies and then ignored its obligation
to comply with Section 17-27-1001 Utah Code Ann. (1991) #5 which
requires a petition for review of the decision below be filed
timely with the district court; namely:

within 30 days after the

local decision is rendered6.
In

this

Commission's

case

plaintiff

December

7,

had

30

days

1994, decision

to

from

the

file

a petition

appealing the decision with the district court.

County

However, the

Complaint was not filed until February 10, 1995, some 65 days after
the County Commission decision.

5

Section 17-27-1001(2) provides as follows:
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a
petition for review of this decision with the district
court within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
Plaintiff argues that it did not have to appear before either
the Planning Commission nor the Zoning Commission. However, this
position is not persuasive. As a matter of law, plaintiff was
required to exhaust its applicable administrative remedies, supra.
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Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional. Burgers v.
Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah
1980)•
Moreover, pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(3), an appeal to the
district court is limited as follows to
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are
valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the [administrative]
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
The limitations on the court's review of the administrative
decision before set forth in Section 17-27-1001(3) underscore the
importance and necessity of developing a factual record through the
administrative review process.
Stonebridge's argument that Mvested rights" issues must be
decided exclusively by the courts because they concern issues of
law is meritless.

Issues regarding vested rights/nonconforming

uses involve determinations both of fact and law.

The clear

administrative scheme of the current statutes is to require the
development of the factual record in the administrative context.
In this process, legal issues are addressed.

There is nothing

unique about "vested rights" as compared to "nonconforming uses" so
far as the necessity of developing the factual record is concerned.

00019*
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Similarly, Stonebridge may not ask for a declaratory judgment
when Utah law expressly provides for an appeal of the County
Commissioners' decision to the Court.

Otherwise, as Salt Lake

County notes, a party who failed to file a timely appeal could
avoid the 30-day requirement simply by asking for declaratory
judgment.

Therefore, Stonebridge's first two causes of action for

declaratory judgment and estoppel are not properly before the
Court.
Both parties rely on Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283
(Utah App. 1994), to support their respective positions.

In

Stucker, the plaintiff filed an action seeking declaratory judgment
relief, writ of mandamus relief and damages resulting from an
alleged unconstitutional, inverse taking of plaintiff's property.
However, plaintiff's reliance on Stucker in this case is misplaced
because it was filed prior to the enactment of Section 17-27-703
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), which grants enabling authority for
boards of adjustment to decide nonconforming uses.
Stucker was also decided prior to the enactment of Section 1727-1001 which provides for an appeal to the district court from
planning and county commission land use decisions. The prior code
did not contain similar provisions.
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Thus, Stucker, like all of the Utah cases on which plaintiff
relies concerning vested rights issues, occurred prior to the
enactment of this legislation.

At the times in which these cases

were filed, boards of adjustment had no authority to determine
nonconforming use issues and there was no appeal process to the
district

court from planning and county commission

land use

decisions. Declaratory and Rule 65B actions were the only remedies
available to review land use issues.

Based on the legislation

having become effective in 1991 and 1992 as discussed above,
parties

now

seeking

determinations

concerning

nonconforming

use/vested rights issues must comply with the relevant appeal
process and time requirements.

III.
Finally, Stonebridge may not maintain its takings claim for
compensation under the United States or Utah Constitutions because
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County
as to what it will be allowed to construct.
In this case, as previously discussed, plaintiff should have
applied to the Board of Adjustments to have the vested rights issue
determined and, if necessary, applied for variances to the R-l-15
zoning. Since 1992, Section 17-27-703(2) (Supp. 1992) has enabled
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cities and counties to delegate to their respective boards of
adjustment the authority to decide nonconforming use issues. Prior
to 1992, boards of adjustment had no such power.
which

plaintiff

relies

to

support

The cases on

its contentions

regarding

ripeness and finality arose prior to the 1992 amendments and do not
involve exhaustion of remedies or ripeness issues.
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that it would be futile
for plaintiff to seek administrative remedies as discussed, supra.
Here, the County Planning Commission has not denied Stonebridge the
right to develop.

Rather, approximately 15 years ago, it granted

preliminary approval to the development.

The Board of Adjustment

has not denied plaintiff's claim to a vested right nor denied
variances to the present ordinance. This is not a case in which a
remedy does not exist.

To the contrary, this is a case in which

the developer has refused to pursue its remedy.
Based on the foregoing, and the other arguments set forth by
defendants, defendants' Motion to Dismiss

is granted

in its

entirety.
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Counsel for defendants is ordered to prepare a proposed Order
consistent with this ruling.
Dated this \€>^Ldav of August, 1995.

ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

r. r.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this (D
August, 1995:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr,
Kevin Egan Anderson
Attorney for Plaintiff
201 S. Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Kent S. Lewis
Deputy County Attorney
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

m

day of

ADDENDUM C

w o iMsrnn COURT
ThirH

JfHWolrjfstrfct

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

: ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 950900959

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI;
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON;
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10;

:
:
:
:

Defendants•

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
under which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on June 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m., the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding; Kevin Egan
Anderson appeared on behalf of plaintiff, Kent Lewis appeared on
behalf of defendants.

The motion was based upon the contention

that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies that
the matter was not ripe for decision. The Court treated the motion
as a motion for summary judgment because an affidavit was filed by
defendants and other documents were presented to the Court by both
parties. The Court having considered the pleadings, Memoranda, and
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documents filed by the parties and having rendered a Memorandum
decision granting defendants' motion and stating the grounds for
such decision,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

Summary Judgment is granted in favor of defendants,

dismissing plaintiff's Complaint.
2.

The

parties

shall

each

bear

their

own

costs

and

attorney's fees.
Dated this £C> —day of December, 1995.

ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE "*^s
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this

day of December,

1995:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Kevin Egan Anderson
Attorney for Plaintiff
201 S. Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Kent S. Lewis
Deputy County Attorney
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
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